Hardware Resource Control in L4 µ-kernels

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SEmba 2011

Motivation

In most operating systems, userland processes have unrestricted access to hardware drivers, by system calls in monolithic kernels or IPCs in µ-kernels such as L4. This unrestricted access can often allow **malicious software to force a denial of service on the driver** or strongly impact its quality of service.

To mitigate this safety issue without impacting much drivers code, **our approach is to extend L4 IPCs by adding a control layer to IPCs aimed at drivers.**
This would allow admission control to the driver, as well as **accounting and managing the driver's occupation by user processes**.

Context: Operating System Kernels

Monolithic Kernels



- All privileged code in kernel
- Communication via method calls
- Unified drivers interface (IOS)

L4 µ-kernel



- Minimal kernel
- Communication via synchronous IPCs
- Userland privileges managed by capabilities

An Example of Resource Monopolization



Delay between application deadlines and actual processing



➔ The quality of service provided by the driver to the normal application is severely impacted

Proposition: Extend L4 IPCs



- **Interception Layer:** Accounts actual hardware usage and reschedules requests if necessary

- **Drivers Manager:** Maintains drivers list, physical memory mappings and IPC capabilities

Expected Benefits

- **Safety:** Prevent malicious threads from monopolizing drivers

- **QoS Management:** Accounting and admission control would allow resource reservation and real-time guarantees

Open Questions

- How about resource control in higher layers?

- Which uniform resource reservation model?

- Robustness of the userland interception server to malicious users?